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CONFLICT AND COMPLICITY: 







During the early morning of 8 February 1928, 21 year old Dmitrii Sergeevich
Likhachev was arrested in his parents’ flat on Oranienbaumskaia Street in
Leningrad. After nearly a year in ‘investigative detention’ he was sent, together
with student friends from a religious discussion group, to serve a five-year sentence





for a documentary film on the camp,
Academician Likhachev recalled the words with which camp guards at the Kem´
transfer point in central Karelia welcomed the newly arrived inmates descending








 evidently impressed itself
deeply in his memory, for he recalled it also in his last published memoir:
 





2. In this paper I use the term ‘special’ camp system to refer to the OGPU-NKVD network of
prison camps, commonly known as the Gulag, as opposed to the camps and colonies at various
times under the authority of the People’s Commissariat of Justice or republican People’s
Commissariats of Internal Affairs. For the development of camp administrative structures and
* I am grateful to the UK Economic and Social Research Council for funding my research on
Soviet Karelia in the 1920s and 1930s, which has formed the basis of this paper. I should also like
to thank Bob Davies, Andrea Graziosi and Peter Gatrell for their comments on drafts of this work.
Abbreviations of archives in references:
– Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF)
– Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial´no-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI, former
Central Party Archive)
– Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Obshchestvenno-Politicheskikh Dvizhenii i Formirovanii
Respubliki Kareliia (GAOPDF RK, former Karelian Party Archive).
–  Tsentral´nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Respubliki Kareliia (TsGARK)
– US State Department, Records relating to internal Soviet affairs, 1930-1939 (T1429).






“I will not describe in detail the first days at Kem, on Popov island and in no. 13
company at Solovki … there is no need to repeat everything. I will merely
observe that as I got out of the car one of the escort drew blood from my face
with his boot, and they all did their utmost to humiliate us. They shouted at us
“
 




Officials of the Unified State Political Administration (the OGPU, informally
known as the Chekists), who not only guarded the perimeters of camps, but also the
external borders and internal social ‘frontiers’ of the state, cultivated the camp
system in isolation from centres of formal political authority. Other Solovetskii





 One former prisoner described A. P. Nogtev, commandant of the
Solovetskii camp, as “an absolutely abnormal person, a maniac, which does not




 Although there is





 and a canon of memoir literature which offers insights into life and death in
individual camps, there have been few attempts to investigate historically the
structures and behaviour of the Gulag at regional level, or the politics of the Gulag
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The present paper attempts to explore these questions by addressing the
development in the 1920s and early 1930s of ‘special’ institutions of forced labour
in the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Karelian ASSR): the
Solovetskii Camp of Special Designation (Solovetskii Lager´ Osobogo
Naznacheniia, SLON, 1923-1931) and the Belomorsko-Baltiiskii Canal





draws primarily on recently released archival documents to substantiate and
supplement the bare outline of the story already known from published memoir
sources. I trace the subsequent history of the Belomorsko-Baltiiskii Kombinat
(BBK, 1933-1941), from 1934 under the authority of the Soviet People’s





central concern is to investigate the complex, evolving configurations of conflict
and complicity among Soviet political, economic and security interests, both in the
centre and locally, and the consequences of their policy decisions for both Karelia
and the regional ‘special’ camp system. That I dedicate relatively little space to
describing the prisoners themselves, their social origins, their struggles to survive
and the remarkable resilience and achievements of many in the face of the most
brutal repression, is not to depreciate the tragedy or dignity of their stories: the





2. The Solovetskii camp, 1923-1931: 
Exigencies, expediencies and expansion
 
Soviet Karelia comprised the eastern section of the larger region of Karelia, which
was divided from north to south in the fourteenth century, and remained divided
between Russia in the east and Sweden (later, Finland) in the west. On gaining
independence in 1918, Finland pressed for a revision of the state border with Soviet
Russia to unite the two halves of Karelia within the new Finnish state. Partly to pre-
empt such demands, partly to establish a model national territory for propaganda
purposes, in 1920 Soviet Russia granted extensive economic and administrative
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‘periphery’ has not only geographical, but also socio-cultural connotations. Of course, socio-
cultural and geographical space may coincide — many of the special camps were located in
remote, peripheral regions of the country, and those situated in central areas were usually on the
outskirts of big cities. For stimulating sociological perspectives on the ‘periphery,’ see among
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autonomy to eastern Karelia within the Soviet border. Edvard Gylling, an exiled
Finnish social democrat, was appointed to lead the new territory, initially the
Karelian Labour Commune (Karel´skaia Trudovaia Kommuna — KTK), from
1923 the Karelian ASSR. His desire to develop Soviet Karelia as a viable
autonomous territory, which could act as a model of socialist inter-ethnic fraternity
and mutual aid and as a beacon of revolution to the Finnish and Scandinavian
working classes, dictated the imperative of building a strong, self-regulating and
self-sufficient economy. However, local labour resources, further depleted by civil
war population displacement, were sorely insufficient to implement his ambitious
plans for post-war reconstruction, timber export and industrial development. In
response, E. Gylling embarked on numerous projects to stimulate the resettlement
of Karelians and Finns in the autonomous republic and to recruit a permanent
workforce for its incipient industry. 
In addition, the Karelian government during the first year of autonomy turned to
the use of prison labour, in line with central penal labour policies and the increasing




 This decision inevitably resulted in conflict





 (government, pre-revolutionary territorial unit), which before
the creation of the KTK had exercised jurisdiction over the southern half of Russian
Karelia, fought to retain authority over Petrozavodsk, capital at this time of both




 which survived outside the borders of the Karelian commune. For a
while, both authorities were reluctantly forced to share institutions, personnel and
premises in the town. E. Gylling, however, was determined that Karelia should
have full control over an integrated, contiguous and coherent territory, and over the
resources contained within the borders of that space. One of the resources that E.




(concentration camp) located on the outskirts of
Petrozavodsk. In June 1921, he submitted a petition to the NKVD of the Russian
Republic (RSFSR) arguing for a transfer of the Neglinka saw-mill to the
jurisdiction of the camp, and the camp itself to the authority of the Karelian
Economic Council, since its “workforce can be used not only in the saw-mill but in
other production, the development of which is delayed by lack of workforce to such
an extent that it is impossible to fulfil even the most urgent tasks, for example, for
export.” Only if Karelia took over the concentration camp, E. Gylling asserted,
would it be able “bravely and confidently to set to the task of fulfilling its economic
programme.” He concluded, indeed, that Karelia’s special economic and
administrative rights required the transfer, since the “principle of autonomy is
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2.1. The establishment of SLON, 1923
 
“Somewhere at the end of the white world, on the shores
of the icebound sea, where eight months in the year
winter reigns, where for months the sun does not appear,
there stands the God-protected convent of Zosimo-
Savvatievo.”
 





From the start, therefore, the Karelian authorities were ready to engage forced
labour in the regional economy, so long as it furthered rather than compromised
their spatial integrity and national autonomy. Consequently, it was with trepidation
that they heard rumours in August 1923 that the OGPU was setting up a prison
camp on the Island of the Revolution (formerly, Popov Island) in the bay of Kem´
in central Karelia. This was worse than mere trespass, since Karelia had just won
control over a saw-mill on the island and needed space there to accommodate a civil




In fact, a far greater threat to their autonomy was looming. In 1919 the OGPU’s
predecessor, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combatting Counter-
Revolution and Sabotage (VChK, or Cheka) had set up a number of forced labour
camps to operate on their own resources in the Arkhangelsk region of northern
European Russia (at Pertominsk, Kholmogory and near the regional capital itself).





 To facilitate the organisation of “efficiently productive work among the




In early 1923, the OGPU proposed massively to expand the northern system by
establishing a new camp located on the Solovetskii archipelago, initially to house
8,000 prisoners, with a new transfer point on the Karelian mainland at Kem´, which
together with the existing Pertominskii camp and the Arkhangelsk transfer point
(which at this time housed 1,200 prisoners) would form a new Solovetskii Forced
Labour Camp of Special Designation (Solovetskii Lager´ Prinuditel´nykh Rabot





 on 18 August 1923, this camp would hold “political and




Letters from Russian prisons…, op. cit.:
 
 162.
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May 1923. See letter from the Karelian Labour Commune (KTK) Executive Committee, signed
by E. Gylling and Iushiev, to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee,
dated 14 August 1923, in GARF, f. 5446, op. 5a, d. 1 (“On organisation of northern forced
labour camps”), l. 11.
15. M. Jakobson, 
 
Origins of the Gulag…, op. cit.:
 
 39; see also “Explanatory notes” to second
OGPU draft of decree “On the organisation of northern forced labour camps,” dated 18 August
1923, GARF, f. 5446, op. 5a, d. 1, l. 24.










) for Administrative Exile” plus









 RSFSR) and the NKVD
had already accepted an earlier draft, although the latter had demanded that a clear
division of penal functions and funding should be established between institutions
under its own Chief Prison Administration (Glavnoe Upravlenie Mest




 Inevitably, the Russian




 RSFSR) had expressed reservations
about the plan, on the grounds that it required a substantial transfer of “property and





At this moment, the Karelian authorities intervened to protest at what they
thought was a new OGPU camp on the Island of the Revolution in Kem´ bay. They
claimed that it was impermissible “to flood with criminal elements parts of Karelia
bordering on Finland [as it would] cause undoubted political harm and [would]





a petition to the NKVD dated 1 August 1923, the People’s Commissar of Internal
Affairs of the Karelian ASSR, N. V. Arkhipov, complained that because criminals
on the island were poorly guarded they frequently escaped into the thick mainland




 In reply, Head of
the Administration of the Northern Camps (USLAG) A. P. Nogtev pointed out that
Karelia only controlled the saw-mill on the island, while the territory itself and its





). This administration had therefore acted within its rights when it
agreed to transfer several empty barracks to USLAG to serve not as a separate
camp, he emphasised, but as a transit point between the Kem´ railway station and
the new camp on Solovetskii Island (which was, in fact, located within the maritime


















2 October 1923 issued a decree establishing the new Solovetskii camp with two
transit points at Arkhangelsk and Kem´, and transferring to it all the goods,
 
17. Second OGPU draft of decree “On the organisation of northern forced labour camps,” dated
18 August 1923, GARF, f. 5446, op. 5a, d. 1, l. 2.
18. Letter of A. G. Beloborodov (GUMZ) to Unshlikht (GPU), dated 14 June 1923, GARF,
f. 5446, op. 5a, d. 1, ll. 3-6.
19. At that date, central funding was limited to only a small number of penal institutions,
housing in total fewer than 15,000 prisoners sentenced by civil organs and 17,300 prisoners




 to GPU, dated
17 June 1923, GARF, f. 5446, op. 5a, d. 1, l. 9.
20. GARF, f. 5446, op. 5a, d. 1, l. 11.
21. Letter from Regional Administrative Department of the Karelian Labour Commune, signed




 probably 1923], in GARF, f. 5446,
op. 5a, d. 1, l. 21.




, dated 19 July
1923, in GARF, f. 5446, op. 5a, d. 1, l. 15.
 




buildings and “living and dead” inventory of the former Solovetskii monastery, the
Pertominskii camp (which was subsequently closed) and the Arkhangelsk camp.
The OGPU was instructed immediately to organise work for the prisoners in
agriculture, fishing, timber and other enterprises. The camp was to be self-




 The first contingents of




The Karelian authorities, having sent petitions against the Solovetskii camp to
the Head of the OGPU F. E. Dzerzhinskii, to the Council of Labour and Defence
(STO), to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) and to the
NKVD, but to no avail, were understandably dissatisfied with this decision. On 21





heard a report that prisoners in the “concentration camp” on the Island of the




), some even travelling at will to
Moscow, and resolved to petition the Party Central Committee (TsK) on the














 When navigation between the mainland and Solovetskii Island had closed
the previous year, he claimed, over one thousand prisoners were stranded on the
Island of the Revolution, and Karelia had been unable to find space to house its own
workers for the saw-mill. Moreover, in the absence of a sufficient guard, prisoners
could freely make the brief crossing from the transit camp to the mainland. From
Kem´, some were escaping westwards, where they were making contact with
Finnish agents, he inferred, since reports of the Solovetskii camp were already
being published in Finnish newspapers. Other prisoners were handing themselves
in to the Kem´ militia, since the town’s prison was considerably more comfortable
than the OGPU barracks.
2.2. The expansion of SLON, 1923-1929
 
The centre paid no heed to Karelia’s vigorous protests. The SLON transit point
remained on the Island of the Revolution, and the Solovetskii camp itself continued
to grow and expand its economic activities. However, the camp’s productive output
and trading activities were insufficient to enable it to achieve self-sufficiency.
During the following years, the Solovetskii camp inexorably expanded in pursuit of
this objective.
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24. See the account in 
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25. GAOPDF RK, f. 3, op. 1, d. 216, l. 182ob.
26. Letter to TsK dated 11 March 1923, “On location of transit point for Solovki concentration




, Karelian Republic,” in RGASPI, f. 17






During the 1924/1925 financial year, the SLON Administration (USLON)
received a subsidy of 500,000 rubles from the government towards the cost of its




 In March 1925,
OGPU Collegium member G. G. Iagoda, together with the Head of the OGPU
Special Department (responsible for the camps at this time) G. I. Bokii and OGPU’s
Head of Finance L. I. Berenzon (later Head of Finance for Belomorstroi), submitted




’s Administrative-Financial Commission for a
further subsidy of 600,000 rubles to cover USLON’s deficit for the following
financial year (starting in June). They justified this appeal by noting that in 1925/
1926 they planned to maintain 5,000 prisoners in the Solovetskii camp at a reduced
cost to the state’s reserve funds of 110 rubles per prisoner, whereas civil prisons the




 For the sake of
comparison, it should be noted that the average annual wage in the civilian




The Commission sent the OGPU’s





Administration for comment. The latter advised that USLON’s expenditures should
be covered wholly by the OGPU’s own budget, and observed that the agency was








 Commission, after meeting to hear reports from L. I.





(no first names identified), agreed in a secret protocol to grant the desired 600,000
rubles for the second half of 1925. A session of the STO chaired by L. V. Kamenev




Such requests became an annual item on the agendas of central administrations
responsible for extra-budgetary funding. In May 1926, the Finance Department of
the OGPU requested 1,200,000 rubles to cover USLON’s envisaged deficit for the
forthcoming financial year, calculated on a projected average of 10,000 prisoners.
This year, they noted, the state would only pay 153 rubles towards the maintenance
of prisoners in the Solovetskii camp (whereas prisoners in civil institutions cost 220
rubles). Not only were OGPU prisoners cheaper, they could also be recruited more
easily and worked harder: “After careful consideration of our estimates, and with
regard for the difficult situation of the state budget,” continued the appeal, “[we]
have recognised the possibility of expanding the camp’s productive enterprises
 





Administrative-Financial Commission, dated 25 March 1925, in GARF, f. 5446, op. 5a, d. 720,
l. 2.
28. Ibid.




, 16-17 (1936). I am very grateful to Bob Davies for indicating
this source to me.




 SSSR Administrative-Financial Commission, dated 30 March 1925,
in GARF, f. 5446, op. 5a, d. 720, l. 3.




 SSSR Administrative-Financial Commission, dated 8 April















above the limits envisaged in the plan.” By increasing output, USLON could raise
its income from the current projected level of 1,700,000 rubles by 350,000 rubles.








 SSSR was severe: the economists considered that
USLON could cut 270,000 rubles from its expenditures by reducing the cost of




 Seeking a compromise, the
OGPU lowered its request to 1,060,000 rubles, which was accepted by the STO in
July. It was also agreed that the OGPU would cover 500,000 rubles of this sum
from its current inventory of confiscated property and money, with the remainder




 1925/1926 reserve fund (which would









 berated USLON for
increasing its camp population from 5,000 to 10,000 within the course of only one
year. This excessively rapid growth, the economists noted, had “rendered the









OGPU evidently believed to the contrary that expanding USLON’s productive
population would in time enable the camp to achieve economic autonomy. Indeed,
G. G. Iagoda claimed that USLON had only been forced into deficit because in late





) to accommodate a large contingent of beggars, who had been expelled





Certainly, the Solovetskii camp continued to grow in population and to increase
both sides of its balance sheet, although not proportionately. According to OGPU
figures, USLON expanded in 1927/1928 to 13,323 prisoners and received





of May 1928, USLON envisaged an increase in population during the following
financial year to 17,000 prisoners and a corresponding increase in its deficit to




 as usual raised objections and G. G. Iagoda
agreed that USLON could make do with a subsidy of 1,600,000 rubles by lowering
expenditure per prisoner to a mere 94 rubles (in contrast to 240 rubles in civil
prisons), and by raising higher revenues from expanded contractual operations on
 




 SSSR, dated 29 May 1926, in GARF, f. 5446, op. 7a, d. 537, ll. 1-6.








 SSSR, dated 11 June 1926, in GARF, f. 5446,
op. 7a, d. 537, l. 7.




 SSSR, dated 3 July 1926, in GARF, f. 5446, op. 7a, d. 537, l.





35. Letter of 
 
Narkomfin SSSR Budgetary Administration of the Army and Navy Department,
dated 23 October 1926, in GARF, f. 5446, op. 7a, d. 113, l. 2.
36. Letter from the OGPU Financial Department, signed G. G. Iagoda, to Sovnarkom SSSR,
dated 30 September 1926, in GARF, f. 5446, op. 7a, d. 113, l. 1. 
37. Letter from the OGPU, signed by G. G. Iagoda, to Sovnarkom SSSR, dated 7 May 1928, in
GARF, f. 5446, op. 9a, d. 444, l. 2.
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the Karelian mainland (since the camp had already achieved capacity output on the
islands).38 In joint session, the STO and Sovnarkom agreed to this sum, offering
one million rubles from the SNK reserve fund and deducting the remainder from
future OGPU earnings.39
In this way, the OGPU steadily expanded the USLON camp population and its
use of prisoners’ forced labour with the aim of increasing revenues and reducing its
stubbornly persistent dependence upon funding from central government.
However, the total costs incurred by the camp’s disproportionately rapid expansion
and increasingly complex economy each year exceeded the new levels of income,
forcing the camp to seek even greater inputs from the centre, in the form of both
higher subsidies and new supplies of labour. An additional and not incidental
consequence of these developments was the incremental reduction of expenditure
per prisoner and corresponding debasement of living conditions. As early as
October 1924, Deputy Head of the OGPU V. R. Menzhinskii wrote to the STO
requesting sufficient strong spirit for prisoners working in lumbering and fishing
enterprises in harsh climatic conditions.40 The “minimum” ration required —
presumably meaning to prevent death by freezing in the sub-Arctic Solovetskii
winter — was just over one millilitre of 96° spirit per convict per day. There is as
yet no systematic statistical evidence of living standards in the 1920s, but for
abundant and horrifying testimony of the heavy human and spiritual cost of such
brutally banal calculations, we need only turn to the abundant memoir literature on
the Solovetskii camp.41
2.3. Relations between USLON and the Karelian authorities, 1923-1929
Having fought bitterly but unsuccessfully in 1923 to prevent the OGPU from
establishing the Solovetskii prison camp, the Karelian leadership throughout the
mid-1920s strove to resist the expanding employment of SLON forced labour on
Karelian territory. However, the Murmansk Railway timber administration
(Zhelles), to which the STO had transferred large swathes of central and northern
Karelian forest in May 1923, willingly accepted the supply of SLON contract
labour to fulfil its own separate production and export plans.42 In an attempt to halt
this practice, the Karelian Central Executive Committee (TsIK) passed a resolution
in early 1925 forbidding the employment of Solovetskii camp prisoners inside the
republic. When the OGPU protested against this resolution to the Union TsIK in
38. Ibid. 
39. GARF, f. 5446, op. 9a, d. 444, l. 1.
40. Letter dated 13 October 1924, in GARF, f. 5446, op. 5a, d. 558. STO allocated the requisite
volume of spirit on 22 October, ll. 1-4.
41. See footnote 4.
42. Secret protocol of the Presidium of the Karelian Central Executive Committee (TsIK),
dated 17 July 1927, in TsGARK, f. 690, op. 1, d. 6-27, l. 65.
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Moscow, E. Gylling hurried to submit a statement to this body’s Presidium (of
which he was a member) defending the autonomous republic’s prerogative to
regulate the use of labour within its own borders, regardless of the immediate
territorial or productive jurisdiction within which the workforce operated. The
Presidium of the Union TsIK, caught between loyalty to its own member and the
impulse to uphold his civic authority on the one hand, and the daunting ‘special’
powers of the OGPU on the other, resolved on a compromise in April 1925,
whereby they warily “proposed to the OGPU that in future it should first agree
questions of using its concentration camp [sic] workforce within Karelian borders
with the TsIK of the Karelian SSR [sic].”43
Neither Karelia nor the OGPU could be satisfied with this ambiguous directive,
which hardly promised to resolve the continuing conflict between the two
authorities. When the Northern Timber Organisation Severoles contracted a
contingent of SLON prisoners for felling within Karelian territory in late summer
of the same year without first obtaining permission from the republican
government, the Karelian Obkom established a committee, chaired by E. Gylling
and comprising two Karelian representatives plus delegates from Narkomput´,
Severoles and USLON, to reach a definitive settlement of this question.44 When
agreement proved impossible, E. Gylling issued a terse reprimand to the
administration of Severoles and set off to USLON headquarters on Solovetskii
Island to negotiate a deal. However, pragmatism overtook his purpose. On 31
August 1925, the Presidium of the Obkom passed a resolution conceding that the
northern Karelian workforce was not sufficient to fulfil local felling plans for 1925/
1926, so USLON should be granted temporary timber felling quotas in these
districts. In return for permission to use forced labour, Severoles should supply the
local civil population with food and alternative felling work (in other words, not in
the vicinity of prisoners).45 The Karelians also decided that although USLON
labour could be used on the construction of the Kem´-Uhkta highway, the entire
project should not be transferred to USLON but should remain under Karelian
administration. At the same time, the regional party submitted the first of many
petitions to the centre for the transfer of the Solovetskii islands to Karelian territory,
and the latest of many requests to move the OGPU transit point off the Island of the
Revolution — none of these appeals was granted. In the meantime, Zhelles simply
continued to ignore the ban on Solovetskii labour.46
43. Protocol 52 of the Presidium of the SSSR Central Executive Committee (TsIK), dated 24
April 1925, in GARF, f. 3316, op. 16a, d. 178, l. 17.
44. Protocol of Presidium of Karelian Obkom, dated 11 August 1925, in GAOPDF RK, f. 3, op.
1, d. 585, l. 105.
45. Protocol of Presidium of Karelian Obkom, dated 31 August 1925, in GAOPDF RK, f. 3, op.
1, d. 585, l. 114.
46. A representative of the Murmansk railway admitted to the Presidium of Karelian TsIK in
July 1927 that his administration had contracts for USLON labour in force until October, but
promised not to renew them after that date. E. Gylling acerbically reminded him that the use of
USLON labour had been banned two years previously. See Secret Protocol of Presidium of
Karelian TsIK, dated on 17 July 1927, in TsGARK, f. 690, op. 1, d. 6-27, l. 65.
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Karelia’s production targets, especially for timber felling, increased sharply in
the late 1920s as its economy was brought under the control of central planning
authorities. However, neither central resettlement initiatives nor the republican
government’s colonisation and recruitment strategies, designed to boost the
region’s ethnic Finnish and Karelian population, succeeded in sufficiently
augmenting the local population or attracting seasonal workers to the region. On the
other hand, the Solovetskii camp offered a local, readily available and growing
reserve of labour. Increased local demand was conveniently met with expanding
USLON supply, itself a result of economic imperatives within the camp system, as
we have seen above. Almost every year until the end of the decade, the Karelian
authorities grudgingly issued emergency governmental or party decrees permitting
local economic agencies to hire contingents of OGPU prisoners for felling or
specific construction projects. Incrementally, therefore, the camp extended its
hinterland sphere of operations on the mainland outwards from Kem´ on the coast
as far north as Murmansk (after 1928, part of Leningrad oblast´) and into the south
and east of the autonomous republic.
Naturally, the republican authorities lamented this development and its
consequences as much as they relied upon it. At a meeting of the Karelian Obkom
Bureau in June 1928, the head of the Karelian State Political Administration (the
political police, GPU), who reported to the Moscow OGPU centre independently of
the ‘special’ camp authorities, noted that 176 SLON prisoners had escaped on the
mainland during 1927 and the first half of 1928, often in groups which roamed the
countryside terrorising local populations. Another local official voiced his concern
about the increased incidence of murder and rape in the vicinity of forced labour
operations. J. E. Järvisalo replied that he had protested in the centre against
SLON’s growing encroachment onto the mainland, but had been informed that
Solovetskii Island was now too small to accommodate the entire camp population
(this, of course, was untrue: in fact, the archipelago had adequate space, but
insufficient resources or productive potential to meet the camp’s self-sufficiency
targets). Nevertheless, the Obkom Bureau passed a resolution stating, with a hint of
despairing resignation, that if the Karelian timber organisation (Karelles) had “the
slightest possibility of not using prisoners for its felling workforce, then it should
not.” Nor should the Murmansk railway use OGPU contingents if it could manage
without; the only project that absolutely required prison labour was the Kem´ to
Ukhta highway construction, and the number and quality of guards along that tract
should be strengthened.47
During the First Five-Year Plan, the Karelian authorities finally gave up
resisting the encroachment by USLON onto mainland territory. The total collapse
of the free labour supply as a result of collectivisation and increased competition for
workers among regions, sectors and enterprises, together with miserable levels of
local kolkhoz mobilisation — despite the attempt to introduce obligatory felling
and road-building service (corvée) — necessitated increasing recourse to the
47. GAOPDF RK, f. 3, op. 2, d. 236, l. 67.
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employment on contract of OGPU forced labour. In any case, the centralisation of
economic decision-making, budgetary control and labour resource allocation
during 1929/1930 rendered Karelia’s special autonomous rights increasingly
meaningless in practice, even if they survived in principle. Moscow commissariats
and agencies had few compunctions about compromising the territorial and
national integrity of the autonomous republic by encouraging the import of a huge
non-national convict population, and they continued to ignore Karelian protests
concerning the strategic and political dangers of locating large numbers of
prisoners close to the border zone, as well as complaints about criminality and
disorder in central districts (raiony) and the dangers of mixing free and prison
workforces.48
2.4. The origins of the Gulag empire, 1929-1931
Russia had long traditions of political and religious deportation and convict
transportation, sometimes combined with forced labour (katorga, first introduced
as a penal measure in the late 1600s). The motives behind sustaining this policy
were complex. In the words of a Russian jurist of the late nineteenth century,
“Russia, in fact, has never considered [transportation] merely as a punishment,
but has used it as a means to resolve problems of internal and external politics
[…] it is one of those rare creations of Russian penal law, born entirely of the
needs and conditions of Russian life.”49
After the Revolution, there was renewed interest in penal transportation as a means
to meet, in the first instance, the political exigencies of the embattled revolutionary
regime. As we have seen, as early as 1919 the Soviets had established concentration
camps in Arkhangelsk oblast´ to isolate antagonistic groups and nefarious
individuals extracted from the centre. Since the early 1920s, however, certain
interests had also considered reviving the use of penal resettlement as a means to
colonise remote regions and to exploit their resources (penal exile having been
48. For example, in a report to the Information Department of the OGPU Administration of the
Leningrad Military Okrug of 10 February 1929, the head of the Karelian GPU Nel´ke noted that
the Karelles saw-mill No. 40 in Kem´ (on the Island of the Revolution) in 1927-1928 employed
698 permanent free workers and 347 USLON prisoners. Because the free workers were
politically reliable, claimed Nel´ke, the prisoners’ attempts to spread anti-Soviet and anti-
semitic agitation failed, but their presence did cause resentment among the free workers who
feared they would be replaced with forced labour, and who saw that the prisoners received
better supplies through corruption at USLON than they did through civil channels. This report
evidently emphasises both central policy priorities of the time and Karelian preoccupations,
and exemplifies the problems of using such sources. GAOPDF RK, f. 3, op. 2, d. 80-365, ll. 22-
37.
49. Ivan Foinitski in I. Foinitski and Georges Bonet-Maury, La transportation russe et anglaise
avec une étude historique sur la transportation (Paris: Lecène, Oudin et Co., 1895): 150. I.
Foinitskii opposed transportation, although he conceded that “elle a eu ses défenseurs comme
peine, comme mesure de sûreté à l’intérieur ou comme moyen d’expansion coloniale,” in ibid.:
257.
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abolished by the tsarist regime in 1900). Head of the OGPU Dzherzhinskii wrote in
1923:
“The republic cannot be merciful towards criminals and cannot waste resources
on them; they must cover the costs associated with their care with their own
labor; they must be used to settle undeveloped areas in Pechora, in Obdorsk
(Salekhard) […] We will have to work to organise forced labour (penal servi-
tude) at camps for colonising undeveloped areas that will be run with iron disci-
pline. We have sufficient locations and space.”50
The idea that forced labour could offer both self-sufficiency on the periphery and
potential economic gain for the centre also appealed to economic interests. In
November 1925, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National
Economy of the SSSR (VSNKh) G. L. Piatakov sent a report to his superior, who
also happened to be Dzherzhinskii (in his role as the Chairman of VSNKh). The
memorandum stated:
“My study of geographical factors affecting industrial issues has convinced me
that in order to create the most elementary conditions for a work culture,
compulsory labor settlements will have to be established in certain regions. Such
settlements could also relieve overcrowding in places of incarceration. The GPU
should be instructed to explore these issues.”51
In the late 1920s, as it became evident that ambitious Soviet schemes, initiated both
centrally and locally, to promote the voluntary settlement of remote regions of the
North had failed, the OGPU undertook to assume the leading role in resettlement.
In 1929, G. G. Iagoda proposed a programme for the penal colonisation of vast
territorial expanses, initially in Ukhta and Pechora, but ultimately stretching from
Karelia and the Kola peninsula, where USLON was already actively expanding, to
the Far East. The immediate objective of this strategy, as stated in the Politbiuro
decree ‘On the use of the labour of criminal prisoners’ of 27 June 1929, was to
“colonise these areas and exploit their natural resources by means of the use of
prisoner labour.”52 
OGPU’s experience of running the Solovetskii camp had demonstrated at least
two things. Firstly, the centre was willing to subsidise the continuous expansion of
forced labour and thereby to underwrite the increased involvement of the OGPU in
the economy. Secondly, the agency’s growing economic significance further
enhanced its prestige and power in the centre and boosted its ability to secure higher
inputs in capital and labour investment to compensate for its higher costs. The
OGPU, for example, was able to secure a decision, despite the opposition of
50. “F. E. Dzerzhinksii o revoliutsionnoi zakonnosti,” Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1 (1958): 19, 21,
cited in G. Ivanova, Labor camp socialism…, op. cit.: 186.
51. G. L. Piatakov had in mind, in the first instance, the northern reaches of the Enisei river,
Sakhalin, the Kirgiz steppe and the Nerchinsk district. Cited in G. Ivanova, Labor camp
socialism…, op. cit.: 70.
52. Politbiuro resolution of 27 June 1929, in RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 746, l. 11.
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Narkomiust and the republican interior ministries, that all prisoners sentenced to
over three years were to be transferred to its jurisdiction and employed in the
‘special’ camps, so long as they were suited to physical labour.53
In the longer term, G. G. Iagoda envisaged that this expanded network of
corrective labour camps (Ispravitel´no-Trudovye Lageria, ITL, as concentration
camps would henceforth be known) would develop into settlements of free workers
populating and assimilating the vast empty northern territories.54 To encourage
settlement, prisoners demonstrating exemplary work or behaviour could look
forward to pre-term release from captivity, on condition they remain in these
inhospitable areas. Other prisoners who had served their full terms but had been
deprived of the right to free choice of residence, as well as those who volunteered to
remain, would benefit from allocations of land in these peripheral regions and cash
grants or equipment. In addition to these measures, the republican interior
ministries were directed by the same decree to ensure all prisoners judicially
sentenced to terms of between one and three years should be organised for optimal
productive output into special agricultural and industrial colonies and to reduce to a
minimum the number of institutions of incarceration.55
The Karelian Obkom Bureau saw both opportunities and dangers in this policy.
Among the perceived benefits were the increased regional capital investment that a
powerful agency in the centre could secure, a steady supply of labour for felling and
construction enterprises and, in the longer term, a means of colonising the remote
northern areas of the autonomous republic. In the late summer of 1929, the Karelian
party passed a resolution acknowledging that it was necessary to ensure “the
maximum use of the USLON workforce on Karelian territory,” especially in
felling, and to use prisoners to establish agricultural and stock rearing kholkhozy in
the exiguously populated northern districts. The USLON party organisation was
directed to conclude a contract with Karelles to supply sufficient labour to achieve a
doubling of the republic’s felling output. For this purpose, the Karelian Obkom also
directed the republican government to draw up a plan to transfer several forest areas
directly to USLON jurisdiction.56
Increasingly desperate for labour resources, the Karelian authorities also
directed the GPU to enforce the corvée more harshly, introduced severe penalties
for ‘desertion’ from felling duties and increased the use of ‘forced labour without
53. Politbiuro resolutions of 16 May and 27 June 1929 ‘On the use of the labour of criminal
prisoners,’ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 740, l. 6 and d. 746, l. 11.
54. Politbiuro resolution of 27 June 1929 ‘On the use of the labour of criminal prisoners,’
RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 746, l. 11.
55. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 746, l. 11. See also Sovnarkom SSSR decree ‘On the use of the
labour of criminal prisoners,’ 11 July 1929, reprinted in M. I. Khlusov, ed., Ekonomika
GULAGa i ee rol´ v razvitii strany. 1930-e gody. Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Institute of
Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences, 1998): 19-20.
56. Protocol of Karelian Obkom Bureau, dated 28 September 1929, in GAOPDF RK, f. 3, op. 2,
d. 329, l. 57. 
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deprivation of liberty.’57 They also turned to the civil penal agencies. In November
1929, the Karelian Obkom permitted Karelles to sign a contract with GUMZ for the
employment of its prison labour in felling, and directed the party fraction in the
republican government to help organise NKVD prison colonies.58 In May 1930, the
Karelian Obkom resolved temporarily to increase the number of GUMZ prisoners
in Karelia from five to six thousand: their extra labour was to be employed on road
construction, recently decreed a priority for strategic reasons. It also directed the
Karelian Sovnarkom to discuss transferring administration of GUMZ prison
colonies on its territory from the Russian federal authorities to the Karelian NKVD.
Finally, the Karelian party undertook, in line with the Politbiuro and SNK decrees
of June 1929, to despatch all local GUMZ prisoners with terms of over three years
to USLON.59
At the same time as permitting this massive increase in Gulag activity on their
territory, the Karelian leadership attempted to curb local Chekist independence and
ensure co-ordination of activity between civil and camp authorities. In March 1929,
the Karelian party requested the TsK to subordinate the Solovetskii party collective
to the Karelian Obkom and to establish an USLON party committee to rank
alongside Karelian raion party committees (raikomy).60 The Karelians argued that
three factors necessitated this measure. Firstly, the camps were geographically
dispersed among Karelia, the Northern krai and Murmansk okrug without any
unified party leadership. Secondly, the dispersal of OGPU party members among
different districts (twenty in Kandalaksha raion, fifteen in Soroka, thirty in
Medvezh´ia Gora in Karelia, and fifty on Solovetskii Island in Arkhangelsk oblast´)
undermined the centralised administration of the camps in Kem´ (where there were
one hundred Chekist party members) — with this, the Karelians were evidently
seeking to establish under their control a unified party leadership in the camp
system as a rival to the existing unified OGPU camp leadership. Thirdly, as a result
of the lack of clarity concerning the role of district party committees in relation to
the camps located within their territorial jurisdiction, “abnormal relations” had
developed between raion leaderships and local camp administrations.61
However, the TsK Organisational-Distribution Department refused either to
establish an USLON party committee or to subordinate the scattered Chekist party
57. For a general description of party and security measures to mobilise the rural workforce to
felling, see F. Pottoev, “Sovetskoe stroitel´stvo AKSSR,” in G. S. Rovio, N. A. Iushchev, E. A.
Gylling, et al., eds, Sovetskaia Kareliia. Ocherki partiinogo, sovetskogo i kul´turnogo
stroitel´stva AKSSR (Moscow and Leningrad: OGIZ, 1933): 120-146.
58. Karelian Obkom Bureau, 18 November 1929, GAOPDF RK, f. 3, op. 2, d. 331, l. 54.
59. Karelian Obkom Secretariat, 20 May 1930, GAOPDF RK, f. 2, op. 2, d. 434, ll. 72-73.
60. The appeal to the TsK of 28 March 1929 is cited in a letter of OrgRasPred TsK to Karelian
Obkom, Leningrad Obkom and Severnyi krai Obkom, dated 18 June 1929, in RGASPI, f. 17,
op. 33, d. 437, l. 71. The Karelians lodged a second appeal on 28 August, see Memo to
Secretariat TsK, no date (soon after 28 August, 1929), RGASPI, f. 17, op. 33, d. 437, ll. 80, 98,
and requested Leningrad’s support for this petition in September, see Protocol of Karelian
Obkom Bureau, 28 September 1929, GAOPDF RK, f. 3, op. 2, d. 329, l. 57.
61. As summarised by the TsK’s rapporteur, in RGASPI, f. 17, op. 33, d. 437, ll. 80, 98.
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collectives to the Karelian Obkom. Firstly, they argued, the transfer of the USLON
headquarters to Kem´ in August 1929 meant that the camp system would be
concentrated predominantly within Karelia. Secondly, the proposed measure would
do nothing to improve the relationship of the dispersed cells of OGPU party
members to the central USLON leadership (thus the TsK defended the Chekist line
of command from party intervention). Thirdly, the Karelian Obkom could improve
relations between raion officials and local camp administrations by improving its
leadership of the district committees.62 As a concession to Karelia, the TsK
Organisational Bureau (Orgbiuro) in June had proposed that, once the Karelians
had secured the approval of the VTsIK Administrative-Territorial Commission and
the OGPU, they could submit another petition to the Presidium of VTsIK
requesting the transfer of the Solovetskii islands to Karelian territory.63
Minor adjustments of the administrative map were, in fact, by now irrelevant.
With a view to implementing G. G. Iagoda’s ambitious schemes for OGPU
expansion and ensuring that the Solovetskii camp consolidated its position as the
centre of productive forced labour activities in the North, A. P. Nogtev presented
the OGPU centre in April 1930 with a plan for the comprehensive restructuring of
the regional camp system, in accordance with the new ‘Statute on ITL’ published at
the beginning of the month.64 This plan envisaged a streamlined central
administration organised according to productive branches and an extensive
territorial network of twelve self-supporting camp sections, each with sub-
departments of the central branch administrations, across the Karelian and Kola
mainland. The project was designed specifically to maximise the productive
efficiency of forced labour organised in remote regions on a mass scale:
“[i]n carrying out the division [of USLON] into [territorial] Sections, economic
considerations were given priority (i.e. the concentration of individual industrial
branch functions) but at the same time, it was impossible not to consider the
special conditions of work of USLON and geographical peculiarities.”65 
A. P. Nogtev envisaged that in the USLON centre the new branch structure would
preclude further conflicts between the camp’s economic and administrative
leadership. The plan is clearly based on the party’s 1929 organisational reforms,
which had been designed to increase the effectiveness of its interventions in the
civil economy during the upheaval of the First Five-Year Plan. A. P. Nogtev now
sought to promote these administrative structures and productive objectives as the
core principles of the camp’s purpose:
62. Ibid., l. 80.
63. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 33, d. 437, l. 71.
64. Sobranie zakonov i rasporiazhenii raboche-krest´ianskogo pravitel´stva SSSR, 22 (1930):
686.
65. Memorandum of April 1930, signed by USLON Chief A. P. Nogtev, in TsGARK, f. 865,
op. 32, d. 1, ll. 2-4, 30-35.
632 NICK BARON
“The central [USLON] function is carried out by the Planning-Control Depart-
ment, as the organ which […] works out the control figures, gives all USLON
Departments and Sections directives on compiling industrial-financial plans,
analyses plans submitted to it and co-ordinates them with projected perspectival
plans, supervises execution of plans, enters required modifications, compiles
summary reports and draws corresponding conclusions and directs all statistical
work carried out in USLON and its Sections.”66
In the territorial sections, the new branch sub-structure, dually subordinated to
central branch departments and the unified territorial economic-administrative
leadership, was intended to promote more autonomous and focussed economic
management. Formerly, A. P. Nogtev stated, central departments had 
“overcentralised the work of the subordinate periphery and frequently, not
having the opportunity sufficiently to learn the needs of the periphery, had
turned their own leadership into petty tutelage (melochnuiu opeku), tying the
hands and feet of the latter.”67 
Because of this, the periphery had endured heavy responsibility without enjoying
any independent rights and had become “a blind executive of the directives of the
Centre.” Under the new plan, territorial sections would operate on their own
balance sheets, in accordance — noted A. P. Nogtev — with the resolutions of the
Sixteenth Party Conference and the TsK.
According to its author, this reform would enable the camp to triple both its
working population (to over 50,000) and its production plan during the subsequent
year. To complement these organisational measures, during 1929 and early 1930 a
new system of production incentives for the prisoners was introduced, and
discipline was strengthened among the guards and camp officials. At this same
time, a former prisoner later testified:
“Beatings stopped, as did overtime work […] prisoners were grouped into
various categories according to their physical fitness and given a certain norm of
work to complete. If not completed, his bread ration was simply reduced in
proportion to the amount done, which automatically forced prisoners to exert
themselves since otherwise they were likely to starve.”68
66. Ibid., ll. 2-4.
67. Ibid. 
68. Interview with SLON escapee Reverand Deinas, United States Consulate, Kaunas, Lithuania,
31 October 1933, in US State Department, Records relating to internal Soviet affairs, 1930-1939
(T1429), 861.5017 - Living Conditions/726. Solzhenitsyn, on anecdotal evidence, has attributed
the inspiration for this reform of working practices to N.A. Frenkel´, a prisoner in SLON since
1927, who allegedly was flown to Moscow in 1929 for an interview with Stalin and high OGPU
officials in which he outlined his vision for the expansion and efficient utilisation of forced
labour, see Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag archipelago, 1918-1956, op. cit.: 73-75. This
account of Frenkel´’s role is corroborated, though with modifications, by several survivor
memoirs (although there is a danger of circularity, since Solzhenitsyn might have used these in his
investigations). See, for example, Ivan Chukhin’s interview with S. L. Moiseev and note on L. M.
Khoruzhik, who recalled an USLON official using the term “frenkelevizatsiia”, in
Kanaloarmeitsy, op. cit.: 30-32; and also Chapter 7, “Frenkel´, frenkelizatsiia i pridurki,’ in
M. Rozanov, Solovetskii kontslager´ v monastyre…, op. cit.: 174-191.
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As A. P. Nogtev’s plan was implemented, the population of SLON grew from
21,900 in 1928/1929 to 65,000 in 1929/1930 and 71,800 at the start of 1931 (see
Figure 1), largely as a result of the OGPU’s own brutal campaigns against the
kulaks throughout the Soviet Union, as well as the assault on industrial specialists
and entrepreneurs, many of whom found themselves on the main island
archipelago.69 Alongside its demographic expansion, the camp experienced a
continuing rapid growth in output that seemed fully to vindicate A. P. Nogtev´s
confidence in the new system. By 1931, as well as timber felling and sawing and
road and railway construction work on the mainland, prisoners were involved in
fishing, agriculture, brick-making and various manufacturing activities, such as the
production of leather goods. In 1930, the official Solovetskii camp journal boasted
that whereas in 1926 USLON had fulfilled orders for Zhelles and Karelles worth
63,000 rubles, by 1929 the value of these operations had grown to 2,355,000 rubles;
similarly, USLON’s participation in road construction had grown from 105,000
rubles in 1926 to six million rubles in 1930.70 The publication, naturally, omitted to
account for the human costs of this expansion: according to a leading Russian
historian of the camps, the mortality rate in SLON in 1931 was 6.2%,71 which
would imply a total number of nearly 4,500 deaths during that year.72 Although the
establishment of Belomorstroi later in 1931 meant that A. P. Nogtev’s plan for
USLON was never fully realised, his project for a giant regional camp complex
would be the model for the future BBK and for the organisation and expansion of
Gulag forced labour throughout the Soviet Union in the 1930s.
2.5. Karelian relations with USLON, 1930-1931
An USLON party representative, D. V. Uspenskii, articulated the OGPU’s new
commitment to complex regional development at the Tenth Conference of the
Karelian Party Organisation in May 1930. The SLON prison workforce, he
declared, must be used more widely in felling, road construction, fishing, and
agriculture in order that Karelia could achieve regional self-sufficiency. The
USLON official had chosen his words artfully: Karelian autarky, of course, had
long been the holy grail of E. Gylling’s republican leadership, although since the
late 1920s it had become an increasingly fantastical aspiration. D. V. Uspenskii
promised that henceforth USLON would direct all its resources towards the
69. Details of the camps’ population growth from M. B. Smirnov, ed., Sistema ispravitel´no-
trudovykh lagerei v SSSR…, op. cit.: 395.
70. It is unclear whether these figures take ruble inflation into consideration. Solovetskie
Ostrova, 2-3 (1930): 56-57, cited in A.Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag archipelago, op. cit.: 51.
71. Zemskov in V. B. Zhiromskaia, ed., Naselenie Rossii v XX veke. Istoricheskie ocherki.
Tom 1. 1900-1939 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2000): 320. Note, however, that the same source gives a
figure of 1,438 death in the Solovetskii camp for 1931, ibid.: 319.
72. This is born out by the memoir evidence, see for example, David J. Dallin, Boris I.
Nicolaevsky, Forced labor in Soviet Russia (New York: Octagon Books, 1974): 188-190.
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development of Karelia. He also declared candidly that the OGPU’s economic
potential was in direct proportion to its repressive efficiency:
“We have grandiose possibilities to use those scrap materials (util´syrs´e), that
flotsam of the October storm (otbrosov oktiabr´skogo shkvala), those shards of
the social structure (oskolkov sotsial´noi stroiki) which come under our autho-
rity in greater and greater numbers the more successfully the struggle progresses
for the definitive extirpation of the remnants of capitalism.”73
The conference’s immediate priority, however, was to ensure an improvement in
relations between USLON and Karelia’s raion party organisations, among whom,
he continued ominously, there had been recent mutterings that “USLON was a class
enemy, that it slows down party development, that it spreads dissolution.” This was
untrue, he responded. Firstly, the Karelians should not confuse the prisoners with
their Chekist masters. Secondly, there was no need to panic about the prisoners,
since they “are wax in our hands and we remould them in our own way.” This, he
concluded, was USLON’s “creative work,” leaving the audience to imagine the
forms and methods of Chekist “creativity.”74 
73. Dated 28 May 1930, Stenogram, in RGASPI, f. 17, op. 21, d. 1910, ll. 41-50.
74. Ibid. 
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Spravochnik (Moscow: Zven´ia, 1998): 162-164, 394-397. 
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Less than a month later, on 18 June 1930, the Karelian Obkom Secretariat
passed a resolution designed to harness the OGPU’s new commitment to regional
development. The resolution ‘On new tasks of OGPU camps of special designation
in colonisation activity,’ based on a report by the new head of USLON A. A.
Ivanchenko (who had replaced A. P. Nogtev on 19 May), declared:
“1. In connection with the shortage of workforce in the Karelian ASSR, consider
it necessary to use USLON workforce in the economic development of Karelia
by means of concluding contracts between USLON and Karelian economic
organisations on a long-term basis; at the same time to provide USLON with its
own economic base for the development of its industrial-economic enterprises.
2. In principle agree to colonisation of specific territories by groups of
USLON prisoners, having made provisions for the political aspects of the ques-
tion, and in agreement with Karelian governmental plans.
3. With regard to the Karelian ASSR’s border position, consider that the
population in USLON camps in Karelia is already at a maximum (predel´noe)
and must not be increased.” 75
In accordance with this decision, a few weeks later USLON submitted a proposal to
construct a large paper and pulp enterprise in Pon´gomskii, in the north of Kem´
raion, and for this purpose asked the Karelian authorities to transfer this district to
its jurisdiction for “long-term autonomous use.” At the same time, the Solovetskii
authorities protested that Karelles had included USLON’s felling programme in the
civilian timber plan for this district. The camp authorities, however committed they
were to regional development, were determined to assert both territorial and
operational independence from the Karelian organisations.76
Cooperation between the Solovetskii camp administration and the civil
authorities was further hampered by persisting conflicts over costs. In May 1930,
Karelles protested to the new Obkom First Secretary Kustaa Rovio that USLON
had demanded an extortionate seven rubles and six kopecks per cubic metre for
timber cut and transported from the Kem´ Lespromkhoz (timber-industrial
enterprise, LPKh), when the standard rate was slightly over three rubles. After
negotiations, the Chekists accepted a rate of six rubles and 36 kopecks, which
Karelles was compelled to pay. The civil organisation, however, could not stretch
to the sum USLON insisted on charging for timber floating. In anger and
desperation, Karelles requested that the TsK should direct USLON to participate in
the regional economic plan by providing labour at the same rates as set for civil
enterprises. If USLON refused, the timber agency threatened vainly, Karelia would
in future refuse to accept its workforce.77 On the same day as Karelles protested via
the party line, E. Gylling wrote to the regional representative of the State Timber
Export Trust (Leseksport) and to the People’s Commissar of the Workers’ and
75. Karelian Obkom Secretariat, 18 June 1930, GAOPDF RK, f. 2, op. 2, d. 434, l. 100.
76. Letter from USLON Timber Felling Section to Karelles, dated 12 August 1930, in
GAOPDF RK, f. 3, op. 2, d. 85-447, l. 29.
77. GAOPDF RK, f. 3, op. 2, d. 85-447, l. 25.
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Peasants’ Inspectorate (Narodnyi Komissariat Raboche-Krest´ianskoi Inspektsii,
NKRKI) G. K. Ordzhonikidze, requesting they intervene to “rectify USLON’s
incorrect attitude” in view of the fact that “Karelian organisations are not capable of
influencing USLON on this issue.”78
There were also persisting tensions between raion soviet and party authorities
and the local camp administrations. In July 1930, the Secretariat of the Karelian
Obkom passed another resolution calling for the TsK to establish an USLON party
organisation subordinated to the Obkom. In the meantime, the Karelian raikomy
should exercise leadership over USLON party cells located on the mainland for
internal party matters, the “everyday economic activity of the camps,” and
education and propaganda among the free workforce. They would also be
responsible for ensuring that local populations were not ideologically contaminated
by their contact with prisoners. Local party officials should not, however, interfere
in the OGPU’s operative work, the resolution concluded confidently, as if its other
clauses stood any chance of acceptance by the camp administrators.79 In reality,
raion officials felt impotent in the face of Chekist arrogance and intimidated by the
presence of large prisoner populations in their localities. In August 1930, for
example, the Medvezh´egorsk raikom requested a delivery of 250 revolvers to
enable local party and soviet workers to protect themselves. Their report to the
Obkom on “the disgraceful conduct of USLON prisoners” stated that prisoners
were roaming freely throughout the district, wreaking havoc and terrifying the local
population to such an extent that citizens were too frightened even to collect berries
and mushrooms in the forest (in Karelia in 1930, these foods would have been
staple sources of nutrition for the malnourished peasantry). The report demanded
that USLON increase the number of guards and curtail the prisoners’ “freedom”
(sic). What caused the local officials most anxiety, however, were unconfirmed
rumours that huge numbers of prisoners were about to arrive to start construction of
a canal on their territory.80
3. The Belomor Canal, 1931-1933
English explorers in the 1560s were the first to propose constructing an artificial
canal connecting the White Sea to Lake Onega, with a view to opening up the
Muscovite interior to the northern trade routes.81 The implementation of this
scheme, however, awaited, in the words of the official OGPU history of the
78. Ibid., l. 26.
79. Protocol of Secretariat of Karelian Obkom, dated 23 July 1930, in RGASPI, f. 17, op. 21, d.
1986, l. 6.
80. Report of 22 August 1930, in GAOPDF RK, f. 2, op. 2., d. 436, ll. 3, 16.
81. For the prehistory of the Belomor scheme, see M. Gorkii, L. Averbakh, S. Firin, eds,
Belomorsko-Baltiiskii Kanal imeni Stalina. Istoriia stroitel´stva, 1931-1934 gg. (Moscow:
OGIZ, 1934, reprinted 1998): 97-99; and Iurii Kilin, “BBK kak faktor voennoi strategii,” in
Sever, 7 (1995): 102, 108.
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construction, “the unified will of the party and the armed theory of Lenin and
Stalin.”82 Equally necessary preconditions were the utopian spatial visions of
Bolshevik planning in the late 1920s; the need to create demand to meet an
explosion in the supply of forced labour resulting from collectivisation; and the
ambition of the OGPU to carry out a prestigious project to prove the economic
efficiency and political value of using its own special methods to open up, colonise
and develop remote regions.
The Soviet Navy reviewed pre-revolutionary plans to build a canal immediately
after the Revolution, but it was not until the late 1920s that the military and political
leadership finally agreed to its construction. Their immediate motivation in making
this decision was strategic: building the canal would enable the Baltic fleet to be
transferred to the ice-free port of Murmansk, constructed in 1916, from where its
ships could gain access westwards to the Atlantic, and via the newly opened Great
Northern Sea Route also to the Far East, where the Japanese threat to Soviet
territory became the regime’s foremost international concern. The other purpose of
the canal, of course, was economic. It would enable the Soviet economy to draw on
new sources of wealth from the Far North, in particular timber, coal, metals and
minerals. Once linked by the Belomor Canal via the Mariinksii water route, which
was already undergoing reconstruction at this time, to the Russian interior and via
the Svir-Ladoga-Neva canals to Leningrad, the Northern Sea Route could also
provide a cheap transport route between Russia’s industrial centres and the Far
East, obviating the need to circumnavigate Scandinavia, and easing congestion on
the railways.83 
From the perspective of Karelian and OGPU regional interests, this project also
opened up the possibility of developing the autonomous republic as a major
industrial centre for processing both timber felled locally by prisoners and raw
materials extracted by forced labour in the camps of the Far North and Far East. The
OGPU also claimed that the construction of a canal would serve to transmit Soviet
civilisation to the frontier. This ‘cultural’ purpose had two aspects. Firstly, the canal
would stimulate economic activity in the North, which in turn would bring the
benefits of the Soviet way of life. The following poem by a Belomor prisoner,
invoking a panoply of prefigurative synecdoche — factories, cities, chimneys,
electric light, reading rooms, club and theatres — exemplifies this Soviet vision of
development:
Gde mshistye skaly i vody
Dremali, tam siloi truda
Postroeny budut zavody
I vyrastut tam goroda.
82. M. Gorkii et al., Belomorsko-Baltiiskii Kanal imeni Stalina…, op. cit.: 25.
83. See Narkomput´ report on the White Sea — Baltic Waterway (Belomorsko-Baltiiskii
Vodnyi Put´, BBVP), no date (mid-1930), in GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1806, ll. 1-3, which offers
a comprehensive list of perceived advantages, lending important insights also into strategic and




Chitalen, teatrov i klubov
Ogniami blesnut korpusa.84
Secondly, the construction project would serve to rehabilitate ‘anti-Soviet’ and
‘socially alien’ elements through purposeful forced labour. Maxim Gorky later
wrote that on the “pedagogical experience of the White Sea-Baltic Canal […] and
other colonies of that type, we, literary figures, must understand what fantastic
results our system of education with the truth provides and how great the power of
this single revolutionary truth is.”85 The canal construction, both by reconfiguring
Soviet ‘natural’ space and by demonstrating the solution of the “greatest scientific-
psychological and philosophical problem of the remaking of people”86 could be
appropriated through propaganda to vindicate Marxist-Leninist ideology and
‘reforge’ society accordingly both on the periphery and in the centre. In the
OGPU’s published history of the construction, the association between ‘natural’
space, human intervention and the transformation of human ‘nature’ is made
explicit: two chapters in sequence are introduced by full-page illustrations
captioned, firstly: “The canal passed here — a new nature has been created” and,
secondly: “By changing nature, man changes himself.”87 The OGPU would be the
instrument of this revolutionary human engineering. In the words of a
contemporary, 
“it is no accident, but deeply symptomatic, that precisely the keenest weapon of
the dictatorship of the proletariat, the ‘guarding sword’ of the proletariat — the
GPU — is not only the weapon of repression, but… the organ of the education
and re-education of people.”88
To what extent the camp officials themselves believed in this ‘higher’ justification
of their activities remains an open question. As we have already heard, USLON
officials too spoke — with ominous ambiguity — of their “creative work.”
84. “Where mossy cliffs and waters/Slumbered, there by the strength of labour/Factories will
be built/And towns will grow./Factory chimneys will rise up/Under the northern skies./
Buldings will shine with the lights/Of reading rooms, theatres and clubs.” Poem by
kanaloarmeets Medvedkov, cited in Petr Karelin, “The first anniversary of the Belomor-
Baltiiskii Combine,” Karelo-Murmanksii Krai, 7-8 (1934): 1. For more Belomorstroi poetry
and songs, see for example, M. Gorkii et al., Belomorsko-Baltiiskii Kanal imeni Stalina…, op.
cit.: 475-478; I. Chukhin, Kanaloarmeitsy, op. cit.: 109, 111, 130-131; Cynthia A. Ruder,
Making history for Stalin. The story of the Belomor Canal (Gainesville: University Press of
Florida, 1998): 12-13, 138-139, 173-185.
85. M. Gorkii, “O kochke i o tochke,” in O literature (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura,
1935): 175, cited in C. A. Ruder, Making history…, op. cit.: 98.
86. Iogann Al´tmann, “Kniga o bol´shoi pobede,” Literaturnyi kritik, 6 (1934): 255, in C. A.
Ruder, Making history…, op. cit.: 151.
87. The second caption is a quotation from Marx. In M. Gorkii et al., Belomorsko-Baltiiskii
Kanal imeni Stalina…, op. cit.: 280, 318.
88. Italics in the original. I. Al´tmann, “Kniga o bol´shoi pobede,” art. cit.: 255-256, in C. A.
Ruder, Making history…, op. cit.: 151.
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Certainly, there were reading rooms, a theatre and clubs for Belomorstroi workers,
and much of the propaganda of the construction project projected narratives of
prisoners finding new meaning in their labour as a result of cultural enlightenment.
Even if the administrators were sincere about this aspect of their work, however, it
was clearly at most incidental to their priorities, which were to build the passage in
the quickest time and at the lowest capital cost, regardless of the suffering involved.
3.1. Belomorstroi: The construction of the canal
On 5 May 1930, the Politbiuro passed a resolution entitled “On the canal” which set
out the main objectives of the construction project: the southern section was to be
started in 1931, and to be finished it within two years, to a depth to permit the
passage of ships of 18-foot displacement, and to a cost of below sixty million rubles;
the northern section (between Lake Onega and the White Sea through central
Karelia) was to be explored by Narkomput´, the military authorities and the OGPU,
and costs were to be minimised by taking into account the possible use of prison
labour.89 On 15 May 1930, a Special Committee for Belomorstroi was established
under the chairmanship of the People’s Commissar of Transport Ia. E. Rudzutak,
including among its members G. G. Iagoda from the OGPU and representatives
from the military.90 On 26 May, Narkomput´ set up an Administration for the
Construction of the Belomorsko-Baltiiskii Water Route (BBVP) under its own
Deputy Commissar G. I. Blagonravov.91 This became the operational
administration of Belomorstroi. On the last day of the month, the Special Committee
agreed that the southern section of the canal should accommodate vessels of 28-foot
displacement and that the OGPU should provide the construction workforce.92
However, a resolution of the STO of 3 June confirmed the earlier Politbiuro
resolution, which had envisaged a depth of 18 feet.93 
In February the following year, the Politbiuro agreed that the OGPU would be
responsible for the canal construction, replacing Rudzutak as Chaiman of the
Special Committee for Belomorstroi with G. G. Iagoda, and confirmed a final
construction plan which, amongst other things, further reduced the maximum depth
89. Politbiuro Protocol 125, 5 May 1930, in RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 784, l. 2. This resolution
has been published in Lars T. Lih, Oleg V. Naumov, Oleg V. Khlevniuk, eds, Stalin’s letters to
Molotov (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995): 212, n. 1.
90. Protocol 1 of Special Committee, in GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1806, l. 5.
91. Instruction of Narkomput´, dated 26 May 1930, in GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1806, l. 10.
92. Protocol 2 of Special Committee, in GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1806, l. 8.
93. STO resolution “On the construction of the Belomorsko-Baltiiskii Canal,” 3 June 1930, in
GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1806, l. 4. The Politbiuro confirmed its decree of 5 May 1930 with a
further resolution “On the Belomorsko-Baltiiskii Canal,” dated 20 June 1930, Protocol 129,
p. 13, in RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 788, l. 3.
Lars T. Lih, Oleg V. Naumov, Oleg V. Khlevniuk, eds, Stalin’s letters to Molotov, op. cit.:
212, n. 1.
640 NICK BARON
of the canal to twelve feet, scarcely sufficient to permit the passage of most naval
vessels. This revision, however, enabled the agency to guarantee it would spend no
more than sixty to seventy million rubles on the construction, including “not one
kopeck of hard currency,” and would finish the project by the opening of navigation
in 1933.94 In April 1931, OGPU personnel took over most of the top posts of
Belomorstroi, frustrated with the interference of their Narkomput´ civilian
counterparts.95 On 16 November 1931, full responsibility for the northern section
was transferred from Narkomput´ to the OGPU. On the same day, the OGPU
established the Belomorsko-Baltiiskii ITL to replace the Solovetskii ITL, since
most of the prisoners in Karelia had by now been transferred from the islands to the
mainland.96 These moves confirmed and strengthened the OGPU’s role as a
powerful economic organisation in its own right, and laid the basis for its future
expansion.
Alongside the OGPU, the Karelian leadership also energetically promoted the
canal project while striving without great success to gain a say in development
decisions.97 At the end of August, E. Gylling secured a seat on the Special
Committee. The protocols of the Committee, however, indicate that he rarely
attended its meetings in Moscow. Indeed, in April 1931, he wrote to Rudzutak (in
the latter’s role as Deputy Chairman of the Sovnarkom) complaining that although
he was a member of the Special Committee on Belomorstroi, he had as yet received
no information from the OGPU concerning the projected route of the canal. The
Administration of Solovetskii Camp (USLAG)98 had even started felling trees
across a swathe of central Karelia due to be flooded,99 without giving the republican
government notice to make arrangements for evacuating nearly 4,000 local
inhabitants,100 for integrating this intensive activity into regional timber plans or for
94. Politbiuro meeting of 10 February 1931, see Protocol 26, dated 15 October, in RGASPI, f.
17, op. 3, d. 813, l. 11.
95. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1806, ll. 24-5. Although Blagonravov was replaced by senior
OGPU official G. E. Prokof´ev as Head of Belomorstroi (until August 1931, when Prokof´ev
was replaced by L. I. Kogan), the chairmanship of the Special Committee in fact alternated
between G. G. Iagoda and N. M. Ianson, head of the new People’s Commissar of Water
Transport (Narkomvod), established on 30 January 1931, which remained responsible for the
construction of a port at Soroka, at the mouth of the canal into the White Sea.
96. M. B. Smirnov, ed., Sistema ispravitel´no-trudovykh lagerei v SSSR…, op. cit.: 162, 394,
396. The Solovetskii ITL was not definitively dissolved until 1 November 1933.
97. In this connection, it is interesting to note that E. Gylling later refused to co-operate with the
OGPU writers’ collective composing a history of the construction, believing — doubtless
correctly — that it would only represent the OGPU’s point of view, see Letter of Engineer
Lunev to the Chief Editor of the BBVP edition, dated October 1932, in TsGARK, f. 520, op. 2,
d. 3/18, ll. 115.
98. For the change of name from USLON to USLAG, probably at the establishment of ULAG
OGPU in May 1930, see M. B. Smirnov, Sistema ispravitel´no-trudovykh lagerei v SSSR, op.
cit.: 395, n. 1. For a brief period, the camp was subordinated to the Karelian GPU, at which time
it was known as Solovetskie i Karelo-Murmanskie lageria OGPU (SKM ITL).
99. In fact, the felling was carried out by Belbaltlag in the Murmansk railway zone under
contract to Narkomput´, for which it charged three million rubles, see GARF, f. 5446, op. 13, d.
519.
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drawing up revised plans for local industrial development. Rudzutak forwarded this
note to the Co-chairman of the Special Committee, People’s Commissar for Water
Transport (Narkomvod) N. M. Ianson, who sent it on to G. G. Iagoda, with a query
scribbled in blue pencil across the top of the page: “Is E. Gylling really a member of
the Committee? No one told me! If so, we should invite him to future meetings of
the Committee.” G. G. Iagoda tersely confirmed that E. Gylling was a member, and
a month later sent the Karelian government a report on the canal, with a note that
the republican People’s Commissariat of Agriculture should liaise with the
Belomorstroi administration (located in Moscow, conveniently just behind the
Lubianka) on questions of evacuating local inhabitants from villages marked for
flooding.101
From this point, E. Gylling took a more active role. In December 1931, he
travelled to Moscow to argue that the centre should subsidise the estimated six
million rubles cost to Karelia of evacuations from the flooding zone. He was not
present, however, when in April 1932 the military protested at projected work on
the Svir section of the canal (on the southern border of Karelia), which would
reduce the canal’s depth to a mere six feet. This, declared the Revolutionary-
Military Council (Revvoensovet) representative, would “completely negate the
purpose of work finished between Onega and the White Sea.”102 The fact that the
canal would be useless for military purposes did nothing to discourage the OGPU,
however, whose only concerns now were to finish the project cheaply, by the
promised deadline and with appropriate publicity. For this purpose, as soon as
navigation opened in spring 1931 they transferred most of the remaining
Solovetskii workforce onto the mainland, as the Medvezh´egorsk raion party
officials had earlier feared.103
In a speech to the Communist Academy and the Institute of Soviet Construction
in October 1933, the chief of Belbaltlag S. Firin stated that 140,000 prisoners had
been employed on the canal project.104 Historians since have offered widely
differing estimates of the numbers of prisoners engaged on Belomorstroi (between
100,000 and 500,000), and of the total number of deaths on the construction project
100. GARF, f. 5446, op. 15, d. 1404.
101. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1805, ll. 81-84.
102. Special opinion of R. A. Muklevich, member of the Revvoensovet, attached to Protocol 7
of Special Committee, dated 26 April 1932, in GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1806, l. 44. For more
detail on this controversy and its consequences, see Iurii Kilin, “BBK kak faktor voennoi
strategii,” in Sever, 7 (1995): 109-112.
103. Likhachev was transferred at this time from Solovetskii Island to a village near
Medvezh´ia Gora, see D. S. Likhachev, Reflections on the Russian soul…, op. cit.: 178-187.
104. Published in Krasnaia Kareliia, 11 March 1934, and in Vestnik Kommunisticheskoi
Akademii, 5 (1933): 90-91 (I am very grateful to Bob Davies for alerting me to the latter
source). Note that in this speech, Firin also stated that only 37 professional Chekists were
employed on the construction site, an improbable figure which might cast doubt on the
credibility of his testimony.
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(between 50,000 and 250,000).105 Archival sources now permit us to calculate more
accurate figures. According to OGPU estimates of 2 July 1931, Belomorstroi
would require thirty million working days to complete the canal by the end of 1932
(over the projected 18 months, this meant an average 55,000 workers on the
construction at any time). In summer 1931, an average 65,000 prisoners were active
on the construction sites each day (plus about 13,000 prisoners in subsidiary
functions). However, the report complained that this workforce was poorly
qualified, equipped only with manual tools, and yielded low productivity.
Optimally the OGPU required a daily workforce of 100,000, but as there was
insufficient accommodation and too few tools for this number, it agreed to make do
with 75,000, although these — noted the memorandum — would have to be
worked very intensively. To raise numbers to and maintain them at this level, the
report requested the central Gulag administration to supply an extra 15,000
prisoners immediately, and up to 43,000 by the end of July (these figures give an
impression of the expected rate of labour turnover). Forward projections for 1932
considered 75,000 workers to be the minimum required, with an optimal number of
90,000, to enable the project to be completed by deadline.106 In fact, a May 1932
report by N. M. Ianson stated that the workforce already totalled 100,000 and
would be raised to 125,000 during July and August (although there were only
barracks for 60,000, and the remainder was accommodated in tents).107 
One other document offers a glimpse of the Belomorstroi labour force. In 1936,
the editor of an anthology of articles on Karelia, Vsia Kareliia, submitted a draft
chapter on the Belomor Canal to D. V. Uspenskii, now head of the BBK, for
approval to publish. The draft was returned with the acerbic comment: “I consider
that the publication of this article is senseless if not harmful.” The NKVD official
had been upset by several statements in the paper. First of all, the author had written
in consecutive phrases that the canal was built by “the hands of over 100,000
prisoners in OGPU camps” in harsh northern conditions and that “against an
estimated cost of 400 million rubles, a total of only about 100 million had been
spent.” “This,” wrote D. V. Uspenskii, “is undoubtedly a reference to the fact that
105. These ranges adapted from R. Stettner’s survey of secondary sources, Archipel GULag,
op. cit.: 231, 234. D. J. Dallin and B. I. Nicolaevsky state that the workforce “reached almost
300,000 at its peak,” in Forced labor in Soviet Russia, op. cit.: 212-213; C. A. Ruder states that
during 1931-1933 over 126,000 prisoners worked on the canal, in Making history…, op. cit.:
25, after I. Chukhin, Kanaloarmeitsy, op. cit.: 209, A. Solzhenitsyn reports that at least 100,000
died during the winter of 1931-1932, and up to 250,000 in total, in The Gulag archipelago…,
op. cit.: 90-91, 94. Tuominen reports an average workforce of 60,000 and estimates deaths
between 60-200,000, Arvo Tuominen, in The bells of the Kremlin. An experience in
communism (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1983): 67, 74. M. B.
Smirnov gives the following archival figures for the average annual Belbaltlag population:
1931-64,000; 1932-99,095; 1933-84,504, in Sistema ispravitel´no-trudovykh lagerei v
SSSR…, op. cit.: 162. See also footnote 112.
106. “Explanatory notes to operative estimates, July-December 1931,” dated 2 July 1931, in
GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1805, ll. 102ob-103.
107. Report on State of Construction of BBVP, dated 1 May 1932, in GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d.
1806, l. 45-55.
THE EXPANSION OF THE KARELIAN GULAG, 1923-1933 643
we drove the prisoners as hard as was possible (iz zaklyuchennykh vyzhali vse).”
The author had also included a discussion of the canal’s strategic significance for
the defence of Leningrad — such considerations were not supposed to be made
public (especially, we suspect, as the completed canal was strategically useless).
Two pages later, the author consummated his error by noting that the completion of
Belomorstroi had in fact required ninety million working days.108 From this
disclosure, we can calculate that over the 21-month construction period the average
number of prisoners working on the site was approximately 143,000. This
corroborates the total given by S.Firin in 1933, but it does not allow for turnover of
workforce, which we surmise was largely accounted for by injury and mortality.
According to figures published by the Russian historian V.N.Zemskov, annual
mortality in the Belbaltlag in 1933 amounted to 10 %.109 This would imply (given
an average population of 143,000) that there were 25,025 deaths on the canal over
the 21-month period of construction. This estimate is considerably greater than the
separate figures V. N. Zemskov offers for total deaths in the Belbaltlag in 1932-
1933 (10,936), but almost identical to the total deaths in Belbaltlag, Solovetskii and
Svirlag (which constructed the southern section of the canal) during the three years
1931-1933 (25,019).110 If this calculation seems far lower than previous estimates
of mortality on the canal, it should be remembered that this accounts only for
immediate deaths; we can assume that numbers who died subsequently as a result
of having been invalided or debilitated by canal work exceed this amount by a high
factor. Even assuming a rate of turnover due to injury at 2% (only a fifth of the rate
of mortality), the total number of prisoners employed on Belomorstroi would have
approached 175,000.111 This was equivalent to over half of the average Soviet
prison camp population in the years 1931-1933.112
As the OGPU indicated, the quality of the workforce presented a problem, but
this was a challenge that Chekist ‘creativity’ could overcome. On 29 November
1930, the deputy head of the OGPU Transport Department V. A. Kishkin and the
deputy head of the Administration of Camps (ULAG) Ia. D. Rapoport (future chief
108. Letter from D. V. Uspenskii to Karelian First Obkom Secretary P. A. Irklis, dated 24
February 1936, in GAOPDF RK, f. 3, op. 4, d. 165/159, l. 36; see also the offending article by I.
V. Pervozvantsev, “Belomorsko-Baltiiskii Kombinat,” ll. 37-66.
109. In V. B. Zhiromskaia, ed., Naselenie Rossii v XX veke…, op. cit.: 320. He does not give
figures for 1931 or 1932, and it should be noted that the 1933 death rate was likely to have been
particularly high owing to the famine. Note also that in 1933 mortality in the Solovetskii camp,
dissolved in that year, amounted to 18.1%, in ibid.
110. V. B. Zhiromskaia, ed., Naselenie Rossii v XX veke…, op. cit.: 119.
111. There are no available figures for prisoners incapacitated by injury. A recent Gulag history
states that on 1 January 1931, of the total Gulag population 1.8% were “non-working” (no
source indicated), M. B. Smirnov, S. P. Sigachev, D. V. Skapov, “Il sistema dei luoghi di
reclusione in Unione Sovietica, 1929-1960,” in M. Flores and F. Gori, eds, GULag. Il sistema
dei lager in URSS, op. cit.: 61.
112. The following figures are given by V. N. Zemskov for total Soviet special camp
populations, with mortality (in brackets): 1931-240,350 (7,283); 1932 - 301,500 (13,267);
1933-422,304 (67,297), in V. N. Zemskov, “GULAG (istoriko-sotsiologicheskii aspekt),”
Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, 6 (1991): 14-15.
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of the BBK, 1933-1935) wrote to G. G. Iagoda complaining that the general
(valovaia) labour force under ULAG’s authority could not carry out technically
more demanding tasks in the southern (Svir) sector of the Belomor Canal. The
solution, they proposed, would be for the Transport Department to send ULAG a
number of recently arrested wreckers, including two major experts in the deepening
of river beds, eight to ten other engineers and ten to fifteen middle-ranking
technicians. It is likely that they are referring to specialists arrested in connection
with the Industrial Party trial, which had opened in Moscow only four days
earlier.113 Although there were only eight defendants at the trial, they were charged
with recruiting over two thousand other specialists as saboteurs, including — as
luck would have it — the entire Central Asian Hydrology Department.114 These
captive experts, Rapoport and Kishkin proposed, would be accommodated in a
special camp to be opened near Leningrad. The Belomorstroi Special Construction
Bureau (Osoboe Konstruktorskoe Biuro, OKB) — perhaps the first ‘official’ camp
sharashka115 — was in fact established in Moscow and moved to Medvezh´ia Gora
in November 1931 (this office evolved into the BBK’s research and planning
bureau, which was located in Leningrad). The letter concluded with a promise
which offers some insight into the priorities and working practices of the OGPU at
this time: “Additionally, in the course of the investigation, several other suitable
persons will be arrested, as planned (budet doarestovano).”116 Indeed, the Industrial
Party case was accompanied by a renewed and intensified wave of arrests of
engineers and specialists accused of wrecking, many of whom found themselves
working in the Belomorstroi OKB.117 The relationship between cause and effect
remains more fully to be explored.
Thanks to its cost-cutting revision of the canal’s blueprints and its ruthless
exploitation of the workforce, the OGPU completed the canal’s northern section,
linking the White Sea and Lake Onega, in June 1933, only one month over its
deadline and within the revised project budget. In July 1933, Stalin directed
G. G. Iagoda to present proposals on awards and amnesties to be given to officials
and prisoners on completion of the canal.118 In early August, the canal was
113. For the Industrial Party case, and its consequences for Soviet professionals, see Roy
Medvedev, Let history judge. The origins and consequences of Stalinism, revised ed. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989): 263-289; R. W. Davies, The Soviet economy in turmoil, 1929-
1930 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989): 406-411.
114. According to Michel Heller, Stacheldraht der Revolution. Die Welt der
Konzentratsionslager in der sowjetischen Literatur (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1975): 130, 134, 137,
cited in R. Stettner, Archipel GULag, op. cit.: 231, n. 223.
115. On sharashki, see Zhak [Jacques] Rossi, Spravochnik po GULAGu (Moscow: Prosvet,
1991): 452-453.
116. It is not clear whether they already had specific people in mind for arrest, or just the
functions that needed fulfilling, GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1805, l. 66.
117. For pen portraits of Industrial Party ‘wreckers’ employed in Belomorstroi, see Chapter 3
of M. Gorkii et al., Belomorsko-Baltiiskii Kanal imeni Stalina…, op. cit.: especially 77-97.
118. Stalin also warned newspaper editors to ensure they published no “boastful comparisons”
with the Suez and Panama canals. Politbiuro Protocol 140, dated 1 July 1933, p. 3, in RGASPI,
f. 17, op. 3, d. 925, l. 2.
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officially opened and a Politbiuro commission headed by Kuibyshev agreed on 15
August to commence the construction of an industrial complex, the BBK, on
territory adjoining the canal.119
The Sovnarkom SSSR decree of 17 August which confirmed the creation of the
BBK and — to E. Gylling’s inevitable disappointment120 — placed it under OGPU
authority, gave the new institution the task of developing the economy of the
recently constructed canal and its adjacent forests.121 This prompted politicians and
planners, in Karelia, in Leningrad and in Union and Russian institutions in the
centre, fundamentally to reconsider their visions of regional development. This also
brought about an increasing coincidence of interests between the Karelian civil
authorities and the OGPU-NKVD. In a subsequent paper, I look at the development
of the Combine in the period 1933-1939, considering in particular its relations with
the Karelian and Leningrad authorities; its visions of spatial development; its
economic planning and performance; the camp population, living conditions and
mortality; discipline, the administration of camp ‘justice’ and the agencies,
procedures and statistics of camp repressions. 122
4. Conclusion
The ‘special’ camp system originated as a means of isolating those perceived to be
hostile to the Soviet system, both political adversaries and recalcitrant criminals, in
remote sites where they could neither attack nor contaminate the centre.
Established in 1923, the Solovetskii camp evolved in the course of the decade into a
powerful regional economic organisation. Each year, the OGPU sent more
prisoners to Solovetskii and expanded the camp’s productive activities with the aim
of reducing its annual deficit and reliance on central funding. However, each year
the growth in population and the increasingly complex camp economy incurred
costs higher than the extra revenue they generated, and the camp continued to
depend on central subsidies to underwrite its further expansion. The Karelian
government strongly opposed the establishment of the camp and strove to resist its
progressive encroachment onto the mainland, but it could do nothing to prevent
other economic organisations, in particular the Murmansk railway, from exploiting
119. In the Politbiuro meeting of 15 August, it was agreed to consider deepening and widening
the canal to permit full military usage, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 928, l. 24. This project was
superseded by the more feasible and cheaper project of building a second canal, running
alongside the first. This, however, was never implemented. See Iu. Kilin, “BBK kak faktor
voennoi strategii,” art. cit.: 111-112; Id., Kareliia i zimniaia voina. Kareliia v 1920-1941 gg.:
diplomatiia, strategiia, ekonomika, politika, unpublished MS, pp. 35-36.
120. With a rare sense of realism, the Karelian Obkom Bureau on 21 June 1933 decided not to
petition to take over control of the Belomor Canal and the industrial combine planned for its
territory, see Protocol 50, in GAOPDF RK, f. 3, op. 3, d. 12.
121. TsGARK f. 865, op. 36, d. 1, ll. 35-36.
122. Nick Baron, “Production and terror: The operation of the Karelian Gulag, 1933-1939,” to
be published in the next issue of the Cahiers du Monde russe..
646 NICK BARON
the supply of camp labour to meet the growing needs of their operations within
Karelian territory. At the end of the decade, Karelian organisations also turned to
USLON as a means of overcoming the critical regional labour shortage.
As demand grew, so did supply. In 1929, G. G. Iagoda defined colonisation and
the economic development of the unpopulated frontiers of Soviet territory as the
primary objectives of the camp system. USLON reformed both its administrative
structure and organisation of labour with a view to increasing its productive
efficiency, and the new system formed the model for other camps established at this
time and later. At the same time, the OGPU received huge numbers of new
prisoners as a result of its terror campaigns in the Soviet countryside, and deployed
these in the newly reformed camp system to further promote its geographic and
economic expansion. The Belomor Canal construction was devised as a showcase
project to demonstrate the economic advantages of forced labour, as well as its
potential to ‘reforge’ criminals and political enemies into loyal, industrious
citizens. This is not to suggest that ‘re-education’ was ever a primary concern of the
‘special’ camp system, but it played an important subsidiary role in rhetorically
justifying the enterprise.
The reality of forced labour, of course, was brutal. Mass killing was never a
primary purpose of the ‘special’ camp system in the period under survey, but
arbitrary brutality and ‘incidental’ death from extreme hardship were defining
characteristics of the OGPU’s camp regime and organisation of production. Forced
labour was also, in the long term, economically counter-productive. The fact that
USLON required annual subsidies from the centre to support its economic
activities and to underwrite its expansion points to the inefficiency of its prison
workforce. More significantly, the fact that the same agency was responsible for
conducting arrests and exploiting the labour of prisoners could not fail to induce its
planners to assume a potentially open-ended labour supply, and to devise
expansionary schemes without due consideration of total costs, including the costs
of human labour transferred from the free to the unfree economy, and the costs
incurred in undertaking projects which would not offer viable economic returns in
the long term, such as the development of the Far North. 
In the late 1920s, however, the OGPU persuaded central authorities of the
advantages of using prison labour on a mass scale as an efficient means of
allocating and utilising human resources during a period of accelerated economic
development and (not coincidentally) of expanding repression. The OGPU’s
interests in promoting Karelian regional development also coincided with the
interests of the republican authorities, who by this stage could find no alternative
way of recruiting sufficient labour to fulfil their plan targets and acceded to the
inevitable further growth of the ‘special’ camp system within their territory.
During the period under survey in this paper, the OGPU ‘special’ camp system
in Karelia expanded as a semi-autonomous institution, fulfilling the state’s security
policy, but also defining its own economic role and the direction and shape of its
own development in response to both central and regional opportunities. The
Karelian camp system established structures, methods and objectives which formed
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a basis for the further expansion of the Gulag throughout the Soviet Union. The
sequel paper will trace how, from 1933 onwards, the Stalinist centre increasingly
asserted political control and planning discipline over the Karelian Gulag,
dismantling the BBK’s grand vision of regional development and defining its
primary tasks of production and repression.
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